Commentary for Bava Kamma 51:16
ולפרוך מה לניזקין דרגל שכן ישנן באש מטמון
might have inferred it from the law applicable to [mere] damage done by Foot.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And not from the law applicable to manslaughter committed by Foot, in which case there may be no ransom at all. [Thus: If in the case of Foot, which involves no liability for damage on public ground, there is liability to pay in full in the plaintiff's premises, does it not follow that, in the case of Horn, involving as it does payment of half ransom on public ground, there should be payment of full ransom in plaintiff's premises.] ');"><sup>25</sup></span> But [if so] cannot the inference be refuted? For indeed what analogy could be drawn to damage done by Foot, the liability for which is common also with Fire [whereas ransom does not apply to Fire]?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For the person liable for arson may, in such a case, be indicted for manslaughter; cf. supra pp. 37-38 and p. 113. ');"><sup>26</sup></span>
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